* feat: streaming container mode, IPC messaging, agent teams support
Major architectural shift from single-shot container runs to long-lived
streaming containers with IPC-based message injection.
- Agent runner: query loop with AsyncIterable prompt to keep stdin open
for agent teams (fixes isSingleUserTurn premature shutdown)
- New standalone stdio MCP server (ipc-mcp-stdio.ts) inheritable by
subagents, with send_message and schedule_task tools
- Streaming output: parse OUTPUT_START/END markers in real-time, send
results to WhatsApp as they arrive
- IPC file-based messaging: host writes to ipc/{group}/input/, agent
polls for follow-up messages without respawning containers
- Per-group settings.json with CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS=1
- SDK bumped to 0.2.34 for TeamCreate tool support
- Container idle timeout (30min) with _close sentinel for shutdown
- Orphaned container cleanup on startup
- alwaysRespond flag for groups that skip trigger pattern check
- Uncaught exception/rejection handlers with timestamps in logger
- Combined SDK documentation into single deep dive reference
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove unused ipc-mcp.ts (replaced by ipc-mcp-stdio.ts)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: clarify agent communication model in docs and tool descriptions
- CLAUDE.md (main + global): split communication instructions into
"responding to messages" vs "scheduled tasks" sections
- send_message tool: note that scheduled task output is not sent to user
- Remove structured output (outputFormat) — not needed with current flow
- Regular output is sent to WhatsApp; scheduled task output is only logged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: ignore dynamic group data while preserving base structure
Only track groups/main/CLAUDE.md and groups/global/CLAUDE.md. All other
group directories and files are ignored to prevent tracking user-specific
session data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve critical bugs in streaming container mode
Bug 1 (scheduled task hang): Task scheduler now passes onOutput callback
with idle timer that writes _close sentinel after IDLE_TIMEOUT, so
containers exit cleanly instead of blocking queue slots for 30 minutes.
Scheduled tasks stay alive for interactive follow-up via IPC.
Bug 2 (timeout disabled): Remove resetTimeout() from stderr handler.
SDK writes debug logs continuously, resetting the timer on every line.
Timeout now only resets on actual output markers in stdout.
Bug 3 (trigger bypass): Piped messages in startMessageLoop now check
trigger pattern for non-main groups. Non-trigger messages accumulate in
DB and are pulled as context via getMessagesSince when a trigger arrives.
Bug 7 (non-atomic IPC writes): GroupQueue.sendMessage uses temp file +
rename for atomic writes, matching ipc-mcp-stdio.ts pattern.
Also: flip isVerbose back to false (debug leftover), add isScheduledTask
to host-side ContainerInput interface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: idle timer not starting + scheduled task groupFolder missing
Two bugs that prevented the scheduled task idle timeout fix from working:
1. onOutput was only called when parsed.result !== null, but session
update markers have result: null. The idle timer never started for
"silent" query completions, leaving containers parked at
waitForIpcMessage until hard timeout.
2. Scheduler's onProcess callback didn't pass groupFolder to
queue.registerProcess, so closeStdin no-oped (groupFolder was null).
The _close sentinel was never written even when the idle timer fired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: duplicate messages and timestamp rollback in piping path
Two bugs introduced by the trigger context accumulation change:
1. processGroupMessages didn't advance lastAgentTimestamp until after
the container finished. The piping path's getMessagesSince(lastAgent
Timestamp) re-fetched messages already sent as the initial prompt,
causing duplicates.
2. processGroupMessages overwrote lastAgentTimestamp with the original
batch timestamp on completion, rolling back any advancement made by
the piping path while the container was running.
Fix: advance lastAgentTimestamp immediately after building the prompt,
before starting the container. This matches the piping path behavior
and eliminates both the overlap and the rollback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: container idles 30 extra minutes after _close during query
When _close was detected during pollIpcDuringQuery, it was consumed
(deleted) and stream.end() was called. But after runQuery returned,
main() still emitted a session-update marker (resetting the host's idle
timer) and called waitForIpcMessage (which polled forever since _close
was already gone). The container had to wait for a second _close.
Fix: runQuery now returns closedDuringQuery. When true, main() skips
the session-update marker and waitForIpcMessage, exiting immediately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resume branching, internal tags, and output forwarding
- Fix resume branching: pass resumeSessionAt with last assistant UUID
to anchor each query loop resume to the correct conversation tree
position. Prevents agent responses landing on invisible branches
when agent teams subagents create parallel JSONL entries.
- Add <internal> tag stripping: agent can wrap internal reasoning in
<internal> tags which are logged but not sent to WhatsApp. Prevents
duplicate messages and internal monologue reaching users.
- Forward scheduled task output: scheduled tasks now send result text
to WhatsApp (with <internal> stripping), matching regular message
behavior. No more special-case instructions.
- Update Communication guidance in CLAUDE.md: simplified to "your
output is sent to the user or group" with soft guidance on
<internal> tags and send_message usage.
- Add messaging behavior docs to schedule_task tool: prompts the
scheduling agent to include guidance on whether the task should
always/conditionally/never message the user.
- Mount security: containerPath now optional, defaults to basename
of hostPath.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cursor rollback on error, flush guard, verbose logging
- Roll back lastAgentTimestamp on container error so retries can
re-process the messages instead of silently losing them.
- Add guard flag to flushOutgoingQueue to prevent duplicate sends
from concurrent flushes during rapid WA reconnects.
- Revert isVerbose from hardcoded false back to env-based check
(LOG_LEVEL=debug|trace).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: orphan container cleanup was silently failing
The startup cleanup used `container ls --format {{.Names}}` which is
Docker Go-template syntax. Apple Container only supports `--format json`
or `--format table`. The command errored with exit code 64, but the
catch block silently swallowed it — orphan containers were never cleaned
up on restart.
Fixed to use `--format json` and parse `configuration.id` from the
JSON output. Also filters by `status: running` and logs a warning on
failure instead of silently catching.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: add Discord badge and community section
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: idle timer reset on null results and flush queue message loss
- Only reset idle timer on actual results (non-null), not session-update
markers. Prevents containers staying alive 30 extra minutes after the
agent finishes work.
- flushOutgoingQueue now uses shift() instead of splice(0) so unattempted
messages stay in the queue if an unexpected error bails the loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: add Agent Swarms to README
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: update Telegram skill for current architecture
Rewrite integration instructions to match the per-group queue/SQLite
architecture: remove onMessage callback pattern (store to DB, let
message loop pick up), fix startSchedulerLoop signature, add
TELEGRAM_ONLY service startup, SQLite registration, data/env/env sync,
@mention-to-trigger translation, and BotFather group privacy docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: Telegram skill message chunking, media placeholders, chat discovery
- Split long messages at Telegram's 4096 char limit to prevent silent
send failures
- Store placeholder text for non-text messages (photos, voice, stickers,
etc.) so the agent knows media was sent
- Update getAvailableGroups filter to include tg: chats so the agent can
discover and register Telegram chats via IPC
- Fix removal step numbering
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update REQUIREMENTS.md and SPEC.md for SQLite architecture
- Replace all registered_groups.json / sessions.json / router_state.json
references with SQLite equivalents
- Fix CONTAINER_TIMEOUT default (300000 → 1800000)
- Add missing config exports (IDLE_TIMEOUT, MAX_CONCURRENT_CONTAINERS)
- Update folder structure: add missing src files (logger, group-queue,
mount-security), remove non-existent utils.ts, list all skills
- Fix agent-runner entry (ipc-mcp.ts → ipc-mcp-stdio.ts)
- Update startup sequence to reflect per-group queue architecture
- Fix env mounting description (data/env/env, not extracted vars)
- Update troubleshooting to use sqlite3 commands
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: fix README architecture description, revert SPEC.md env error
- README: update architecture blurb to mention per-group queue, add
group-queue.ts to key files, update file descriptions
- SPEC.md: restore correct credential filtering description (only auth
vars are extracted from .env, not the full file)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
419 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
419 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Mount Security Module for NanoClaw
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*
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* Validates additional mounts against an allowlist stored OUTSIDE the project root.
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* This prevents container agents from modifying security configuration.
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*
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* Allowlist location: ~/.config/nanoclaw/mount-allowlist.json
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*/
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import fs from 'fs';
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import path from 'path';
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import pino from 'pino';
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import { MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH } from './config.js';
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import { AdditionalMount, AllowedRoot, MountAllowlist } from './types.js';
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const logger = pino({
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level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info',
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transport: { target: 'pino-pretty', options: { colorize: true } },
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});
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// Cache the allowlist in memory - only reloads on process restart
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let cachedAllowlist: MountAllowlist | null = null;
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let allowlistLoadError: string | null = null;
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/**
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* Default blocked patterns - paths that should never be mounted
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*/
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const DEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
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'.ssh',
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'.gnupg',
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'.gpg',
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'.aws',
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'.azure',
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'.gcloud',
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'.kube',
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'.docker',
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'credentials',
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'.env',
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'.netrc',
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'.npmrc',
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'.pypirc',
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'id_rsa',
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'id_ed25519',
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'private_key',
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'.secret',
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];
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/**
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* Load the mount allowlist from the external config location.
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* Returns null if the file doesn't exist or is invalid.
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* Result is cached in memory for the lifetime of the process.
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*/
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export function loadMountAllowlist(): MountAllowlist | null {
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if (cachedAllowlist !== null) {
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return cachedAllowlist;
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}
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if (allowlistLoadError !== null) {
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// Already tried and failed, don't spam logs
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return null;
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}
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try {
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if (!fs.existsSync(MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH)) {
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allowlistLoadError = `Mount allowlist not found at ${MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH}`;
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logger.warn(
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{ path: MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH },
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'Mount allowlist not found - additional mounts will be BLOCKED. ' +
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'Create the file to enable additional mounts.',
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);
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return null;
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}
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const content = fs.readFileSync(MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH, 'utf-8');
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const allowlist = JSON.parse(content) as MountAllowlist;
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// Validate structure
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if (!Array.isArray(allowlist.allowedRoots)) {
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throw new Error('allowedRoots must be an array');
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}
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if (!Array.isArray(allowlist.blockedPatterns)) {
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throw new Error('blockedPatterns must be an array');
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}
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if (typeof allowlist.nonMainReadOnly !== 'boolean') {
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throw new Error('nonMainReadOnly must be a boolean');
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}
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// Merge with default blocked patterns
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const mergedBlockedPatterns = [
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...new Set([...DEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATTERNS, ...allowlist.blockedPatterns]),
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];
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allowlist.blockedPatterns = mergedBlockedPatterns;
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cachedAllowlist = allowlist;
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logger.info(
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{
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path: MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH,
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allowedRoots: allowlist.allowedRoots.length,
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blockedPatterns: allowlist.blockedPatterns.length,
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},
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'Mount allowlist loaded successfully',
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);
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return cachedAllowlist;
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} catch (err) {
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allowlistLoadError = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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logger.error(
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{
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path: MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH,
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error: allowlistLoadError,
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},
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'Failed to load mount allowlist - additional mounts will be BLOCKED',
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);
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Expand ~ to home directory and resolve to absolute path
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*/
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function expandPath(p: string): string {
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const homeDir = process.env.HOME || '/Users/user';
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if (p.startsWith('~/')) {
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return path.join(homeDir, p.slice(2));
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}
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if (p === '~') {
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return homeDir;
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}
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return path.resolve(p);
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}
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/**
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* Get the real path, resolving symlinks.
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* Returns null if the path doesn't exist.
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*/
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function getRealPath(p: string): string | null {
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try {
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return fs.realpathSync(p);
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Check if a path matches any blocked pattern
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*/
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function matchesBlockedPattern(
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realPath: string,
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blockedPatterns: string[],
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): string | null {
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const pathParts = realPath.split(path.sep);
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for (const pattern of blockedPatterns) {
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// Check if any path component matches the pattern
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for (const part of pathParts) {
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if (part === pattern || part.includes(pattern)) {
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return pattern;
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}
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}
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// Also check if the full path contains the pattern
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if (realPath.includes(pattern)) {
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return pattern;
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}
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}
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return null;
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}
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/**
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* Check if a real path is under an allowed root
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*/
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function findAllowedRoot(
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realPath: string,
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allowedRoots: AllowedRoot[],
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): AllowedRoot | null {
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for (const root of allowedRoots) {
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const expandedRoot = expandPath(root.path);
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const realRoot = getRealPath(expandedRoot);
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if (realRoot === null) {
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// Allowed root doesn't exist, skip it
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continue;
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}
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// Check if realPath is under realRoot
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const relative = path.relative(realRoot, realPath);
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if (!relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative)) {
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return root;
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}
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}
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return null;
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}
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/**
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* Validate the container path to prevent escaping /workspace/extra/
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*/
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function isValidContainerPath(containerPath: string): boolean {
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// Must not contain .. to prevent path traversal
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if (containerPath.includes('..')) {
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return false;
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}
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// Must not be absolute (it will be prefixed with /workspace/extra/)
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if (containerPath.startsWith('/')) {
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return false;
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}
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// Must not be empty
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if (!containerPath || containerPath.trim() === '') {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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export interface MountValidationResult {
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allowed: boolean;
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reason: string;
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realHostPath?: string;
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resolvedContainerPath?: string;
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effectiveReadonly?: boolean;
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}
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/**
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* Validate a single additional mount against the allowlist.
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* Returns validation result with reason.
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*/
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export function validateMount(
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mount: AdditionalMount,
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isMain: boolean,
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): MountValidationResult {
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const allowlist = loadMountAllowlist();
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// If no allowlist, block all additional mounts
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if (allowlist === null) {
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return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: `No mount allowlist configured at ${MOUNT_ALLOWLIST_PATH}`,
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};
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}
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// Derive containerPath from hostPath basename if not specified
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const containerPath = mount.containerPath || path.basename(mount.hostPath);
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// Validate container path (cheap check)
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if (!isValidContainerPath(containerPath)) {
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return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: `Invalid container path: "${containerPath}" - must be relative, non-empty, and not contain ".."`,
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};
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}
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// Expand and resolve the host path
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const expandedPath = expandPath(mount.hostPath);
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const realPath = getRealPath(expandedPath);
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if (realPath === null) {
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return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: `Host path does not exist: "${mount.hostPath}" (expanded: "${expandedPath}")`,
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};
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}
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// Check against blocked patterns
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const blockedMatch = matchesBlockedPattern(
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realPath,
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allowlist.blockedPatterns,
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);
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if (blockedMatch !== null) {
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return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: `Path matches blocked pattern "${blockedMatch}": "${realPath}"`,
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};
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}
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// Check if under an allowed root
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const allowedRoot = findAllowedRoot(realPath, allowlist.allowedRoots);
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if (allowedRoot === null) {
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return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: `Path "${realPath}" is not under any allowed root. Allowed roots: ${allowlist.allowedRoots
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.map((r) => expandPath(r.path))
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.join(', ')}`,
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};
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}
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// Determine effective readonly status
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const requestedReadWrite = mount.readonly === false;
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let effectiveReadonly = true; // Default to readonly
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if (requestedReadWrite) {
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if (!isMain && allowlist.nonMainReadOnly) {
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// Non-main groups forced to read-only
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effectiveReadonly = true;
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logger.info(
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{
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mount: mount.hostPath,
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},
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'Mount forced to read-only for non-main group',
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);
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} else if (!allowedRoot.allowReadWrite) {
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// Root doesn't allow read-write
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effectiveReadonly = true;
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logger.info(
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{
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mount: mount.hostPath,
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root: allowedRoot.path,
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},
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'Mount forced to read-only - root does not allow read-write',
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);
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} else {
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// Read-write allowed
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effectiveReadonly = false;
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}
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}
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return {
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allowed: true,
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reason: `Allowed under root "${allowedRoot.path}"${allowedRoot.description ? ` (${allowedRoot.description})` : ''}`,
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realHostPath: realPath,
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resolvedContainerPath: containerPath,
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effectiveReadonly,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Validate all additional mounts for a group.
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* Returns array of validated mounts (only those that passed validation).
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* Logs warnings for rejected mounts.
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*/
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export function validateAdditionalMounts(
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mounts: AdditionalMount[],
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groupName: string,
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isMain: boolean,
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): Array<{
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hostPath: string;
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containerPath: string;
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readonly: boolean;
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}> {
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const validatedMounts: Array<{
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hostPath: string;
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containerPath: string;
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readonly: boolean;
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}> = [];
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for (const mount of mounts) {
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const result = validateMount(mount, isMain);
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if (result.allowed) {
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validatedMounts.push({
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hostPath: result.realHostPath!,
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containerPath: `/workspace/extra/${result.resolvedContainerPath}`,
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readonly: result.effectiveReadonly!,
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});
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logger.debug(
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{
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group: groupName,
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hostPath: result.realHostPath,
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containerPath: result.resolvedContainerPath,
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readonly: result.effectiveReadonly,
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reason: result.reason,
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},
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'Mount validated successfully',
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);
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} else {
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logger.warn(
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{
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group: groupName,
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requestedPath: mount.hostPath,
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containerPath: mount.containerPath,
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reason: result.reason,
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},
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'Additional mount REJECTED',
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);
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}
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}
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return validatedMounts;
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}
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/**
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* Generate a template allowlist file for users to customize
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*/
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export function generateAllowlistTemplate(): string {
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const template: MountAllowlist = {
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allowedRoots: [
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{
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path: '~/projects',
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allowReadWrite: true,
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description: 'Development projects',
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},
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{
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path: '~/repos',
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allowReadWrite: true,
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description: 'Git repositories',
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},
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{
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path: '~/Documents/work',
|
|
allowReadWrite: false,
|
|
description: 'Work documents (read-only)',
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
blockedPatterns: [
|
|
// Additional patterns beyond defaults
|
|
'password',
|
|
'secret',
|
|
'token',
|
|
],
|
|
nonMainReadOnly: true,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
return JSON.stringify(template, null, 2);
|
|
}
|